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ABSTRACT
We propose a cloud-based filter trained to block third parties from
uploading privacy-sensitive images of others to online social me-
dia. The proposed filter uses Distributed One-Class Learning, which
decomposes the cloud-based filter into multiple one-class classifiers.
Each one-class classifier captures the properties of a class of privacy-
sensitive images with an autoencoder. The multi-class filter is then
reconstructed by combining the parameters of the one-class autoen-
coders. The training takes place on edge devices (e.g. smartphones)
and therefore users do not need to upload their private and/or sensi-
tive images to the cloud. A major advantage of the proposed filter
over existing distributed learning approaches is that users cannot ac-
cess, even indirectly, the parameters of other users. Moreover, the
filter can cope with the imbalanced and complex distribution of the
image content and the independent probability of addition of new
users. We evaluate the performance of the proposed distributed filter
using the exemplar task of blocking a user from sharing privacy-
sensitive images of other users. In particular, we validate the be-
havior of the proposed multi-class filter with non-privacy-sensitive
images, the accuracy when the number of classes increases, and the
robustness to attacks when an adversary user has access to privacy-
sensitive images of other users.
Index Terms— Distributed Learning, One-Class Autoencoder,
Privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Unauthorized sharing of potentially privacy-sensitive images of
other users is an increasingly important privacy challenge in online
social media. To protect privacy, a cloud sharing images should
filter uploaded content to prevent the sharing of unauthorized (or
undesired) privacy-sensitive images. However, to reach this goal a
service provider would need to access the privacy-sensitive images
themselves in order to produce a hash or to train a filter. This cen-
tralized learning solution only shifts and does not solve the problem
of maintaining certain images private [1].
This privacy challenge could be addressed by distributed learn-
ing [2, 3], where each user (i.e. each edge device) uploads to the ser-
vice provider only the parameters of their machine learning model
(from a local copy of the service provider’s learning model), not their
raw images. The service provider then fine-tunes the global learning
models by combining the values of the parameters of each user. Fi-
nally, the updated parameters are downloaded by the device of each
user, which would consequently update their local learning models
and upload the updated parameters back to the cloud. This iterative
process stops when a certain classification accuracy is achieved.
While distributed learning can be considered more privacy-
friendly than centralized learning (as a result of uploading param-
eters of local models instead of raw image dataset), it has impor-
tant limitations. First, the parameters of each user are not only
shared with the service provider, but also (indirectly) with the other
users when the shared parameters are downloaded from the cloud.
Through the analysis of the parameters during the training phase an
adversary user can recover information about the training data of
other users [4, 5]. Second, the user should have access to data of
several classes as each user updates the parameters of a local copy
of a multi-class classifier. This is in contrast to our scenario where
each user only has access to data of their own class(es). Third, a new
user cannot join the system during the test phase when other users
are using the service, and therefore scalability is an issue.
To tackle these limitations, we propose DOCL, a Distributed
One-Class Learning approach that decomposes the global filter down
to N one-class classifiers distributed among the users. Each user
trains an autoencoder as a classifier on their privacy-sensitive data.
The autoencoder learns to reconstruct its privacy-sensitive training
image with minimum error. The global filter then aggregates all
the one-class autoencoders and, to discriminate between classes and
block privacy-sensitive images, measures the dissimilarity between
new images uploaded by (other) users and the reconstructions of the
autoencoders.
The proposed filter has several desirable properties. The train-
ing of each one-class classifier is independent from that of the other
classifiers and therefore training data and parameters are not shared
among users, thus preserving the privacy of training data against ad-
versary users. Moreover, as the global filter is decomposed into a
series of simple one-class classifiers trained by the users themselves,
even the service provider has no access to the privacy-sensitive im-
ages of the users. In addition to the above, the proposed filter can
cope with imbalanced training data, which is an important property
as the number of training images for the different classes is likely
to be different. In particular, when the imbalance of the training
data increases, the performance of one-class classifiers is almost sta-
ble, whereas that of, for example, multi-class classifiers (even binary
classifiers) decreases [6]. Finally, the size of the global filter depends
on the number of users, which can be easily increased by uploading
their one-class classifiers trained on their privacy-sensitive images to
the cloud at any point.
2. THE DISTRIBUTED LEARNING MODEL
2.1. The local classifier: training at the edge
One-class classifiers or data descriptors [7] learn to distinguish the
target class from outlier classes (i.e. when only data of the target
class are available) using density estimation [8], data reconstruc-
tion [9] or closed boundary estimation [10, 11, 12]. In our pro-
posed framework, DOCL, each user trains as classifier a one-class
autoencoder [9], a three-layer parametric neural network with an in-
put layer, a data representation layer, and an output layer [13, 14, 15].
For simplicity but without loss of generality, let the number
of classes correspond to the number of users, N . Let the users
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{u0, u1, ..., uN−1} train independently N one-class autoencoders
on their privacy-sensitive image datasets {I0, I1, ..., IN−1}. Each ui
feeds their set Ii = {Ii,0, Ii,1, ..., Ii,j , ..., Ii,Ki−1} to a ResNet [16],
which is already pre-trained by the service provider in the cloud.
Note that the cardinality of each set |Ii| = Ki may considerably
differ across users. For each Ii, ResNet generates the corresponding
feature set, Xi, defined as:
Xi = {xi,0,xi,1, ...,xi,j , ...,xi,Ki−1}, (1)
where xi,j ∈ RD and D is the feature dimension.
The parametric encoder of user ui obtains hi,j ∈ RM , a feature
representation whose dimension M < D, by applying a Rectifier
Linear Unit f(·) [17] on the linear combination of the elements of
feature xi,j :
hi,j = f(Wixi,j + bi) ∀j = 0, 1, ...,Ki − 1, (2)
where Wi ∈ RM×D and bi ∈ RM are the parameters of the en-
coder for user ui. Then the parametric decoder of user ui maps
feature representation hi,j to the feature reconstruction xˆi,j ∈ RD
by applying a sigmoid function g(·) [18] on the linear combination
of the elements of hi,j :
xˆi,j = g(W
′
ihi,j + b
′
i) ∀j = 0, 1, ...,Ki − 1, (3)
where W
′
i ∈ RD×M and b
′
i ∈ RD are the decoder’s parameters for
ui.
Let C(·) represent the binary cross-entropy differences among
features and feature reconstructions:
C(xi,j , xˆi,j) = −
D∑
l=1
xi,j(l) log xˆi,j(l)+(1−xi,j) log(1−xˆi,j(l)),
(4)
where xi,j(l) and xˆi,j(l) are the l-th elements of xi,j and xˆi,j , re-
spectively. The final parameters for ui, {W∗i ,W
′∗
i ,b
∗
i ,b
′∗
i }, are
learned with the following optimization:
{W∗i ,W
′∗
i ,b
∗
i ,b
′∗
i } = argmin
{Wi,W′i,bi,b
′
i}
Ki−1∑
j=0
C(xi,j , xˆi,j) (5)
and are obtained using ADADELTA [19]. These parameters are then
uploaded to the cloud for the global filter to populate the N -class
classifier composed of N one-class1 autoencoders. Note that un-
like [2, 3], in our case the parameters of each user are not down-
loaded by other users.
Moreover, each user ui uploads to the global filter also the pa-
rameters that describe the distribution of the differences, d(xi,j , xˆi,j),
between the input features and the reconstructed features for all
training images, using the final parameters of their autoencoder.
These differences are computed as:
d(xi,j , xˆi,j) =
D∑
l=1
||xi,j(l)− xˆi,j(l)||22, ∀j = 0, 1, ..,Ki − 1,
(6)
where xi,j(l) and xˆi,j(l) are, respectively, the l-th elements of fea-
ture vector of a training image and that of its reconstruction. The
edge device of each user, ui, fits the distribution di,j = d(xi,j , xˆi,j)
∀j = 0, 1, ..,Ki−1with a normal distribution and uploads its mean,
µi, and standard deviation, σi, to the global filter in the cloud.
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the global filter. The service provider ex-
tract the features xt from a newly uploaded image It passes them
through the N one-class autoencoders, each trained independently
by users. The minimum dissimilarity between xt and its reconstruc-
tions xˆt is then analyzed by the Guard module prior to sharing It.
2.2. The global filter
After aggregating the N locally trained one-class autoencoders in
the global filter, users can use the service by uploading their images
(see Fig. 1).
Let a user upload image It during the test phase. Prior to sharing
that image, the service provider checks its legitimacy by feeding the
features xt generated from It to the global filter, which generates the
reconstructed feature vector xˆti for each autoencoder:
xˆti = g
(
W
′∗
i
(
f(W∗i x
t + b∗i )
)
+ b
′∗
i
)
∀i = 1, 2, .., N. (7)
Each autoencoder reconstructs differently images of the same
class as its training set and images of another class [9]. Hence the
service provider quantifies the dissimilarity between the features of
the uploaded image, xt, and of the reconstructed N feature vectors,
xˆti , generated by the N autoencoders, and determines the minimum:
dti∗ = min
i=1,..,N
D∑
l=1
||xt(l)− xˆti(l)||22, (8)
where xt(l) and xˆti(l) are the l-th elements of feature vector of the
uploaded image and of its i-th reconstruction, respectively.
The best reconstruction (i.e. the minimum dissimilarity score,
dti∗) is expected for the class of the uploaded image belongs to. If the
minimum dissimilarity does not correspond to the class of the user
who has uploaded the image, then that image should be labeled either
as privacy-sensitive image of another user (and therefore blocked) or
as non-privacy-sensitive image for any of the contributing users (and
therefore shared).
To decide whether an image should be blocked or shared, we
propose a Guard module that the service provider uses to determine
the privacy interval of each autoencoder using its µi and σi, which
were estimated at the end of the training phase (see Sec. 2.1). The
privacy interval of each user ui is [µi−ασi, µi+ασi], which defines
1Note that this is the worst case of imbalanced training data, where data
of each user belongs to one class only.
u0 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 u9
IMDB 402 414 347 528 559 198 414 704 619 554
CIFAR-10 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
MNIST 5923 6742 5958 6131 5842 5421 5918 6265 5851 5949
Table 1. A sample image for each class and the number of training images from the IMDB, CIFAR-10, and MNIST datasets.
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Fig. 2. Per-class accuracy of the global filter on IMDB (left), CIFAR-10 (middle) and MNIST (right) images. Note that for IMDB we used
two autoencoders with representation layers of size 32 and 132 .
the values of d(xt, xˆti) for which I
t should be considered a privacy-
sensitive image of user i. The value of α ∈ [1, 2] defines the desired
confidence value (see Sec. 3). If the minimum distance is outside this
interval, It is not considered as privacy-sensitive and hence shared.
Otherwise, It is blocked by the Guard.
Note that each user can define multiple classes of privacy-
sensitive images by training additional one-class autoencoders.
Moreover, the proposed filter is scalable as each user individually
trains a one-class classifier and this process takes place separately
from that of other users. The number of users can, therefore, be
increased in the test phase: new users train a one-class classifier on
their privacy-sensitive images and upload the resulting parameters to
the cloud to join the filter of the service provider. We will quantify
the impact of increasing the number of users in the next section.
3. EVALUATION
To validate the performance of the proposed filter, we measure its
overall accuracy, the per-class accuracy, the acceptance rate, the ro-
bustness to attacks and its scalability. As proof of concept that covers
different classes a user might want to protect, we use three datasets
(see Table 1): IMDB [20], CIFAR-10 [21] and MNIST [22]. We con-
sider real limitations in these experiments such as different sizes of
users’ training dataset and limited training data. We assumeN = 10
users, each represented by one class.
We randomly choose 10 celebrities from the IMDB dataset (5
different sets) as users/classes. We assume that the privacy-sensitive
data are their faces and therefore we detect and crop the faces [23]
with size (3 × 224 × 224). The feature extractor of each user
(i.e. same for all users) ui extracts a D = 2, 048 dimension feature
vector. We consider a smaller and a larger autoencoder which differ
only in the size of their representation layer (32 and 132, respec-
tively). Hence the size of input, representation and output layers are
2, 048, 32 (or 132) and 2, 048, respectively. To mimic the protection
of classes of images other than people or faces, we use CIFAR-10,
which contains 50K training and 10k test images (3×32×32) of 10
classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship
and truck. Users obtain a D = 256 dimension feature vector [24]2
from their images and hence the size of input, representation and
output layers are 256, 32 and 256, respectively. Finally, we consider
MNIST includes 60K training and 10K test (1×28×28) images of
10 different handwritten digits. For example, u0 has 5,923 images
of digit 0 and u1 has 6,742 images of digit 1 for training their one-
class autoencoder. Due to the simplicity of this dataset, no feature
extractor is used and the raw pixel values are given as input to the
autoencoder. The size of input, representation and output layers of
each user’s one-class autoencoder are 784, 32 and 784, respectively.
We first quantify the overall accuracy as the ratio between the
number of correctly predicted labels for all classes and the total num-
ber of test data of all of the classes; and the per-class accuracy as the
ratio between the number of correctly predicted labels of each class
and the total number of that class.
The overall accuracy of the global filter is 97% and 80% on
MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively; whereas the overall accuracy
for IMDB with the smaller and larger autoencoder is 92% and 97%,
respectively. The per-class accuracy is shown in Fig. 2. In MNIST
the accuracy of digit 0 is over 99%, that of digit 9 is approximately
95%, as this digit shares similarity with digits 3, 4 and 7. The pro-
posed filter performs better on MNIST and IMDB, which are more
related to our application, than on CIFAR-10, which has a high inter-
class variability.
Next, we quantify the acceptance rate of the Guard as ratio be-
tween the number of correctly shared non-privacy-sensitive images
and the total number of uploaded non-privacy-sensitive images. We
analyze the behavior of the global filter when a user, who contributed
an autoencoder or is a new user, uploads non-privacy-sensitive im-
ages. We consider two scenarios: images that are substantially dif-
ferent from or are very similar to the privacy-sensitive images of
registered users. The former scenario includes images of Fashion-
MNIST [25], with (1 × 28 × 28) fashion products’ images of 10
categories (t-shirt/top, trouser, pullover, dress, coat, sandal, shirt,
sneaker, bag and ankle boot) in the MNIST experiment. The lat-
2Modified version of ResNet for data of the size (3 × 32 × 32) (e.g.
CIFAR-10)
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Fig. 3. Accuracy vs. acceptance rate on IMDB (left) and MNIST
(right) when varying the confidence level α ∈ [1, 2] in the Guard.
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.88 .84 .84 .00 .89 .80 .82 .87 .91 .89
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Fig. 4. Accuracy in detecting an adversary user in IMDB (left),
CIFAR-10 (middle) and MNIST (right) with the global filter.
ter scenario includes faces with new identities (i.e. not used in the
training phase) of IMDB for the IMDB experiment. Fig. 3 shows
the relationship between sharing non-privacy-sensitive data (accep-
tance rate) and blocking privacy-sensitive images (overall accuracy).
The larger the privacy interval in the Guard, the larger the overall
accuracy and the lower the acceptance rate.
Moreover, we analyze the robustness of the global filter against
attacks when an adversary gains access to the data of another user
and attempts to share their privacy-sensitive images publicly. We
assume that the adversary user has full knowledge (i.e. full access)
of the training images of some users. This adversary user can train
their local one-class autoencoder on the combination of his/her im-
ages with the available images of other users. Hence, the adversary
user uploads the trained one-class classifier to the cloud in order to
fool the service provider in sharing privacy-sensitive images of their
targeted users. To quantify robustness we consider each user as an
adversary and compute the accuracy of detecting and blocking that
user (Figure 4). The rows and columns represent adversary and vic-
tim users, respectively. For example, when we consider u3 as an
adversary and u2 as victim user, it means that u3 trains his/her lo-
cal one-class autoencoder with images of u3 and of u2. Then u3
uploads the trained one-class autoencoder to the cloud. Sharing
privacy-sensitive images of each user by other users is blocked in
IMDB dataset better than with the other two datasets. This result
stems from the dissimilarity of data from different classes. For ex-
ample in MNIST, digits 2 shares considerable similarities with digit
7, so u7 succeeds in nearly 3 out of 10 attempts of sharing images of
u2 when training a one-class autoencoder on data of digit 7 as well
as digit 2.
Finally, to evaluate the scalability of the framework, we analyze
the per-class accuracy trend when the number of classes increases.
The per-class accuracy of the global filter for IMDB, CIFAR-10 and
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Fig. 5. The effect of increasing number of classes in IMDB (up),
CIFAR-10 (middle) and MNIST (bottom) on the per-class accuracy
of the global filter for u0 , u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 , u5 ,
u6 , u7 , u8 , u9 .
MNIST for a varying number of classes is shown in Figure 5. The
plots compare the accuracy of each class with different numbers of
classes, i.e. different combinations of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 classes. The influ-
ence on performance when increasing number of classes on per-class
accuracies in IMDB and MNIST is smaller than in CIFAR-10, be-
cause of its intra-class variability. The more similar the images in
one class, the smaller the decrease in per-class and overall accuracy
when the number of classes increases.
4. CONCLUSION
We presented a filter that aims to prevent a user from sharing to a
social networking website privacy-sensitive images of other users
without their consent. The proposed filter enables a centralized clas-
sification without the need of sending the training data to the central
server/cloud as the training phase is performed independently for
each user on their specific class(es).
This work is the first step in bringing one-class classifiers to dis-
tributed learning approaches in order to design a cloud-based filter
with collaboration from the users with minimum computational costs
and privacy loss. Giving sharing permission or blocking the upload-
ing image is based on the comparison of the filter output and the user
who has uploaded the image.
Future work includes extending the validation of the proposed
filter on larger datasets and on different types of privacy-sensitive
data beyond images.
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